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Available online 09 November 2016High immunization coverage rates are desirable in order to reduce total morbidity andmortality rates, but itmay
also provide an incentive for herd immunity free riding strategies. The aim of this paper was to investigate the
link between cognitive ability and vaccination intention in a hypothetical scenario experiment about Avian Flu
immunization. A between-subject scenario experiment was utilized to examine the willingness to undergo vac-
cinationwhen the vaccination coveragewas proclaimed to be 36, 62 and88%. Respondentswere later assigned to
a “Beauty contest” experiment, an experimental game commonly used to investigate individual's cognitive abil-
ity. Results show that there was a signiﬁcant negative effect of the proclaimed vaccination uptake among others
on the vaccination intention. However, there were no signiﬁcant association between the “Beauty contest” indi-
cator of cognitive ability and the use of herd immunity free riding strategies.
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Keywords:
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Immunization is one of the most cost-efﬁcient medical treatments
available, but the potential for societies to secure the public health ben-
eﬁts generated by vaccinations can be limited by the social dilemma of
immunization (Bauch, 2005). A communicable disease is subject to
transferability, which implies that one individual's health can affect
the health of others. By means of herd immunity, individual immuniza-
tionwill confer protection to other people and contribute to a reduction
of disease prevalence in society. However, high immunization coverage
in society may stimulate herd immunity free-riding strategies, deﬁned
as attempts by individuals beneﬁt fromapublic goodwithout contribut-
ing themselves. If most other people are immune, individuals can bene-
ﬁt from the herd immunity without being exposed to any potential side
effects of the vaccination. As a consequence, free riding may result in
suboptimal immunization coverage rates from a societal perspective,
and so increase total morbidity and mortality (Bauch, 2005; Hershey
et al., 1994; Vietri et al., 2012).
Game-theoretical simulations show that free riding reduces the pos-
sibility of attaining socially optimal immunization coverage rates. In
classical game-theoretical predictions, individuals are assumed to be
fully rational and have perfect knowledge about the individual's proba-
bility of infection. Under such assumptions, immunization coverage
rates converge towards Nash equilibrium, the point at which no one
could be better off by individually changing their strategy. Even though
every individual guides his or her behaviour according to self-interest,nc. This is an open access article undthis will lead to suboptimal outcomes in a societal perspective (Bauch,
2005; Fu et al., 2011).
The overall objective of this paper is to explore underpinning as-
sumptions of game theory approaches to herd immunity free riding
strategies. In game theory approaches it is assumed, among other
things, that individuals act strategically and respond to other people's
vaccination behaviour. Empirical studies of vaccination behaviour – for
example, surveys and scenario experimental studies – have conﬁrmed
that the possibility to free ride often plays a role in the individual's deci-
sion-making about immunization (Bauch, 2005; Betsch et al., 2013;
Hershey et al., 1994; Ibuka et al., 2014; Vietri et al., 2012; Zijtregtop et
al., 2009). However, this is far from being a golden rule. In fact, these
studies also found that some people seem to be indifferent to the prev-
alence of herd immunity and don't use herd immunity strategies.
This paper is an attempt to account for this puzzling heterogeneity,
by exploring the role of cognitive ability in the vaccination decision.
The aim is to investigate theway inwhich an indicator of cognitive abil-
ity associates with vaccination intention in a hypothetical scenario ex-
periment about immunization. The investigation is carried out in two
steps. Firstly, the paper investigates whether individuals respond to
the possibility to use herd immunity free riding strategies. Using a sur-
vey experimental procedure, the paper investigates the way in which
proclaimed immunization uptake among other people inﬂuence on
the individual willingness to vaccinate. Hypothetically, the willingness
to vaccinate is higher if immunization coverage rates are lower.
Secondly, the paper investigates the link between an indicator of
cognitive ability and herd immunity free riding strategies. In this part
of the investigation, respondents of the hypothetical scenario experi-
ment were assigned to a web-based “Beauty contest” experimenter the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Fig. 1. Mean immunization intent and 95% C.I. Mean immunization intent, and 95%
conﬁdence intervals.
Source: The Citizens Panel (IV), 2012.
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“Beauty contest” experiment is an experimental game commonly used
to investigate individual's cognitive ability. Hypothetically, cognitive
ability is associated with individual herd immunity free riding strate-
gies, because it is supposed to be necessary for the detection of the pos-
sibility of using such strategies.
It is well known that cognitive ability is linked to economic decisions
making (Frederick, 2005). But despite that studies have found cognitive
ability to be linked to free riding behaviour (Nielsen et al., 2014) and
that immunization clearly has a free riding component, very few stud-
ies, if any, have investigated the link between cognitive ability and
herd immunity free riding behaviours. It is therefore interesting to in-
vestigate if such a link could be observed in relation to herd immunity
strategies.
2. Methods and materials
2.1. Step 1: scenario experiment
In the ﬁrst step, a total of 400 individuals participating in a survey
scenario experiment were asked to assess their willingness to vaccinate
against a hypothetical outbreak of Avian Inﬂuenza. Respondents were
randomly drawn from a web-based panel of Swedish citizens called
the Citizen Panel, which was made available by the Multidisciplinary
Opinion and Democracy Research (MOD) group at the University of
Gothenburg in Sweden. The scenario experiment was in ﬁeld between
March 26th and April 12th, 2012. Participators were self-recruited via
Internet advertising and exclusively included people living in Sweden.
In total, 341 respondents out of the 400 returned the survey.
In the scenario experiment, one third of the participants were given
a scenario where immunization coverage rates among other people
were proclaimed to be 36%, as compared to 62 and 88 respectively in
the two remaining thirds (see Appendices A and B for proof of random
assignment and the scenario vignette).
After the scenario experiment, the survey participants were asked to
answer how willing they would be to vaccination against the Avian
Inﬂuenza, on a scale from 1 to 7, where low numbers represent low
willingness to be vaccinated and high numbers high willingness
(mean 5.08, SD 2.17, skewness−0.775, min/max 1–7).
2.2. Step 2: “Beauty contest” experiment
Approximately one year after the hypothetical scenario experiment,
between February 27th and March 31th, 2013, respondents of the
scenario experimentwere assigned to aweb-based “Beauty contest” ex-
periment. The “Beauty contest” experiment is awell-studied dominance
solvable experimental game (Bosch-Domenech et al., 2002; Duffy and
Nagel, 1997; Nagel, 1995). Prior research shows that, in “Beauty con-
test” experiments, an entry closer to Nash equilibrium or closer to the
winning choice is strongly associated with cognitive ability (Burnham
et al., 2009).
Beauty contest entries argued to be linked to cognitive ability for two
reasons. Firstly, subjects with lower cognitive ability might have difﬁ-
culties in calculating the equilibrium. Secondly, the link between cogni-
tive abilities and Beauty contest entries might be due to that higher
ability subjects are more equipped to form non-equilibrium beliefs
about the entries of co-players (Burnham et al., 2009). In other words,
respondents of the Beauty contest need to ﬁgure out that the Nash equi-
librium is zero, but also adjust their answer to the possibility that other
respondents might not realise this.
In this web-based “Beauty contest” experiment, respondents were
simultaneously instructed to pick a number between 0 and 100. Aswin-
ner of the “Beauty contest”was to be selected the person whose chosen
number was closest to 2/3 of the average of all the choices. In order to
increase participators' motivation, respondents were told that the win-
ner of the Beauty contest experiment was to receive movie giftvouchers. Respondents were not informed about the number of respon-
dents participating in the “Beauty contest” experiment. Out of 341
respondents assigned to the experiment (all respondents who previ-
ously answered the vaccination question), 275 returned the survey
and selected a number in the “Beauty contest”, resulting in a response
rate of about 81%. Two respondents having selected numbers above
100 were removed from the analysis.
In total, 273 participants answered the question according to
instructions. The mean entry in the “Beauty contest” was 48.88
(SD 20.87, skewness−0.083, min/max 0,100) and the Standard Devia-
tion 20.87. According to the instructions given in the “Beauty contest”,
the winning number was to be the integer closest to 2/3 of the average,
which turned out to be 33.
In comparison with similar experiments carried out on a population
of students or self-selected participants through “Beauty contest” ex-
periments in newspapers, the mean number found in this web-based
experiment was substantially higher (Bosch-Domenech et al., 2002;
Duffy and Nagel, 1997; Nagel, 1995). It was closer, compared to the re-
sult of the same experiment conducted with a population drawn from a
population-based registry (Burnham et al., 2009). In the distribution of
responses, peaks may be noticed at 33 and 22), indicating steps of rea-
soning also registered in prior “Beauty contest” experiment research
(Nagel, 1995).
The number (0−100) selected by each participator was used as the
Beauty contest indicator of cognitive ability. An alternative indicator
could have been based on the amount of deviation from the winning
number, but the former of these alternatives is somewhatmore strongly
related to cognitive ability (Burnham et al., 2009).
2.3. Statistics
In the statistical analysis, using the SPSS 21 software package,
ANOVA analysis was carried out to investigate the association between
proclaimed immunization uptake and immunization willingness. To
measure the effect of the coverage rate stimuli, signiﬁcant tests, 95%
conﬁdence intervals (C.I.) and the effect sizemeasure η2 was calculated.
To investigate the link between the indicator of cognitive ability and
herd immunity free riding strategies, ANCOVA analysis (95% C.I.) was
used.
3. Results
Among the participants of the scenario experiment, mean
willingness to vaccinate was 5.59 (95% C.I. 5.20–5.99) when 36% were
reported to vaccinate, but 4.99 (C.I. 4.53–5.44)when 62%were reported
to do so (see Fig. 1). And when as many as 88% were proclaimed
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to 4.67 (C.I. 4.18–5.15). The difference between the three groups is
signiﬁcant and η2 is 0.032 (F (2269) 4.383, p = 0.013, η2 = 0.032).
However, the results from the ANCOVA analysis indicate that there
was no signiﬁcant interaction between the “Beauty contest” entry
and proclaimed vaccination uptake among other people (F = 0.762,
p= 0.782).
4. Discussion
The results of the empirical investigation indicate that mean
willingness to vaccinate is signiﬁcantly lower, when the stated vaccina-
tion uptake among others is higher. It is likely that this is due to that
respondents exploit the possibility of adopting herd immunity free
riding strategies. The prior litterateur about vaccination behaviour
have conﬁrmed that the possibility to free ride sometimes play
a role for the individual's decision-making about immunization
(Hershey et al., 1994; Vietri et al., 2012; Zijtregtop et al., 2009). Howev-
er, there were no signiﬁcant association between the “Beauty contest”
indicator of cognitive ability and the use of herd immunity free riding
strategies.
Despite that cognitive ability has been linked to economic free riding
behaviour (Nielsen et al., 2014) this study failed to found a similar link
with regard to immunization. To some extent, this may signify that de-
cision-making in relation immunization is not directly comparable to
economic free riding behaviour. Instead of implementing policies to
incentivise immunization behaviour, policy maker may rather pay
attention to the role of social norms for vaccination behaviour
(Rönnerstrand, 2013) and communicate the social beneﬁt of vaccina-
tions (Betsch et al., 2013).
Tomy best of knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study to investigate the link
between “Beauty contest” entry and vaccination intention. However,
this study has several limitations. First, survey participators were self-
recruited via Internet advertising. Politically interested, more highly ed-
ucated males are over-represented in the panel as compared to what is
the case in surveys of a representative sample of the Swedish popula-
tion. However, since random selection to the stimuli groups was used,
the effect of immunization coverage on vaccination intent at least can-
not be attributed to the sample characteristics. Secondly, the mean
number found in the “Beauty contest” experiment was quite high. This
may indicate that participators did not pay sufﬁcient attention to the in-
structions, which might have negative consequences for the validity of
the “Beauty contest” indicator of cognitive ability. Thirdly, using the
Beauty contest as a single indicator of cognitive ability is a limitation. Al-
though this measure is strongly linked to certain kinds of cognitive abil-
ity, it may not overly generalize to cognitive ability more broadly.
Finally, a within subject design – in which respondents report immuni-
zation intent in relation to several different levels of immunization up-
take – would have allowed for a more direct investigation of the link
between strategic reasoning and free riding. However, between subject
investigations of herd immunity strategies tend to trigger variation in
responses and hence potentially overestimate free riding behaviour
(Vietri et al., 2012).
Appendix A. Control of randomizationDifferent groups
(mean values)
Experimental groups 36% 62% 88% All F value p value
Sex (1 = w, 2 = m) 1.59 1.67 1.62 1.63 0.541 0.583
Age 50.4 49.9 48.9 49.7 0.240 0.787
Left-right scale (1–5) 2.93 3.10 3.11 3.05 0.470 0.625
Comment. ANOVA showed no signiﬁcant differences between the experimental groups
when it comes to sex, age, and political orientation from left to right.Appendix B. Scenario
A new global epidemic is being spread
Imagine the following scenario:
In the spring of 2012 a new global epidemic has broken out and au-
thorities expect the spread of contagion to culminate in Sweden early in
the summer. The epidemic, which has its origin in South East Asia, is a
new variant of the Avian inﬂuenza. Through a virus mutation the dis-
ease is now transmissible between humans and highly infectious. The
particular composition of this virus has the effect that symptoms only
affect (women/men), but both males and females can transmit
contagion.
In the on-going outbreak the symptoms of the bird ﬂu include sud-
den fever, cough and shortness of breath, muscle ache, and a general
sense of illness. In seriously affected humans the dominating symptom
has been serious respiratory troubles often requiring intensive care
medicine, using medical ventilators, and even a heart-lung machine
(CPB pump). The virus is transmitted through direct contact in the
same way as that of ordinary seasonal inﬂuenza is. When an infected
person is coughing or sneezing, particles are spread by means of aero-
sols containing the virus, which will infect anybody that inhales them.
Since earlier known variants of the H5N1 virus are distinct from the
new virus, most people cannot be expected to have built any immunity
against the new virus.
During the spring of 2012 the healthcare system will be providing
vaccine free of charge. Besides offering protection to the individual, vac-
cination reduces the risk of spread in the population at large. In other
words, the risk of contracting the bird ﬂu is reduced also for unvaccinat-
ed persons. Well-documented scientiﬁc studies show that the part of
the Swedish population that will have vaccinated amounts to around
XX (36, 62, or 88) percent.
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